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JURISDICTION STATEMENT 
Pursuant to U.C.A §78A-4-103(2)(e), the Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
of this matter, inasmuch as it is an appeal from a court of record in a criminal case not 
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Was the Defendant denied the effective assistance of counsel? Claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel are subject to a two-prong analysis: (1) Whether 
counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) whether that performance prejudiced the 
defendant. Adams v. State, 123 P.3d 400, 406, 2005 UT 62, ^[25. 
2. Was the Defendant denied critical materials necessary to mount an effective 
defense, contrary to U.C.A. §77-32-301? Public defense resources are subject to an abuse 
of discretion standard. State v. Carreno, 113 P.3d 1004, 1005, 2005 UT App 208, f7. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Amendment VI, U.S. Constitution: "In all criminal prosecutions, the acused shall 
enjoy the r ight . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 
Article I, Section 12, Utah Constitution: "In criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel..." 
U.C.A. §77-32-301 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Reed was originally charged on September 16, 2007 with one count of 
Purchase, Transfer, Possession or Use of a Firearm by a Restricted Person, a Second 
Degree Felony, in violation of U.C.A. §76-10-503. 1-2. He was convicted by a jury on 
December 19, 2007. 72-74, 165. On April 9, 2008, he was sentenced to one to fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison. 132-139. He is presently incarcerated. 
The Notice of Appeal was originally filed on April 21, 2008. 140-141. That appeal 
was dismissed on May 22, 2008, for failure to file a docketing statement. On June 5, 
2008, the Appellant moved to reinstate the appeal under Rules 23, and 23 A of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. The motion was granted on June 6, 2008. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of September 16, 2007, Mr. Reed and another man, together with 
Mr. Reed's girlfriend, Megen Bell, got a flat tire while in Roosevelt, in Duchesne County. 
The three set about knocking on doors at a housing complex looking for a jack to fix the 
tire. The two mean approached a Mr. Martinez, who was visiting a friend. According to 
Mr. Martinez, Mr. Martinez got suspicious and went home to get a knife. When he came 
back, the man accompanying Mr. Reed became aggressive and pulled a gun on Mr. Marti-
nez. Mr. Martinez was able to describe this gun in some detail. Mr. Martinez then put his 
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knife to the gunman's throat. Mr. Reed, who was standing a short distance behind the 
gunman, is then alleged to have pulled out some object, which may have been a part to a 
tire jack, but which the State maintains was a gun. 165, pp. 127-138, 153-159, 204-211. 
Mr. Reed denies having had a gun, and none of the witnesses could describe the 
gun in any kind of detail. 165, pp. 204-211. Notwithstanding Mr. Martinez possessed only 
a knife, both Mr. Reed and the unidentified gunman promptly backed away from Mr. 
Martinez, then ran away. The two, together with Ms. Bell then drove away in the van with 
the flat tire. Police arrested Mr. Reed a short time later. The original assailant remains 
unidentified. No gun was ever seen or retrieved by the police. 165, pp. 173-201. 
A public defender was appointed to represent the Defendant. 6-7. Although she 
was provided with Ms. Bell's witness statement, and was aware that Ms. Bell could 
corroborate Mr. Reed's testimony that he did not have a gun, the attorney failed to call 
Ms. Bell as a witness. Prior to trial, trial counsel moved the court to order the production 
of a number of items, which would have been very useful in undermining the State's 
witnesses. 21-35. However, although the trial court never ruled on the motions, trial 
counsel made no objections, asked for no continuance, and proceeded to trial without the 
benefit of any impeachment materials. To date, the trial court has still not ruled on any but 
one of the motions. 
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Mr. Reed stipulated at trial that he is a previously convicted felon (165, pp. 194-
195), but was adamant that he was aware of the restrictions the conviction carried with it, 
and would not have carried a weapon under any conditions. 165, pp. 210-211. The jury 
deliberated for two hours. Although the jury ultimately convicted Mr. Reed, they did not 
do so without first contacting the trial judge regarding a possible deadlock. 165, p. 244. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The critical issue before the jury was whether or not Mr. Reed possessed a gun. 
Prior to trial, trial counsel requested a number of items for the ostensible purpose of 
impeaching the State's evidence. However, after motioning the trial court to order pro-
duction of the materials, trial counsel entirely abandoned any effort to obtain them. Mr. 
Reed was denied the use of these materials, and thereby denied effective representation. 
II. The police reports and witness statements make clear that Mr. Reed's girlfriend 
was present, and could have verified Mr. Reed's own testimony that he had no gun. Yet, 
inexplicably, trial counsel failed to call Ms. Bell as a witness. It is clear that trial 
counsel's performance was deficient in failing to call Ms. Bell, and it is equally clear that 
Mr. Reed's defense was prejudiced by this deficiency. 
III. Although trial counsel properly requested a number of items essential to Mr. 
Reed's defense, the trial court failed to rule on those motions prior to trial, and indeed, 
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has never ruled on those motions at all. Mr. Reed was thus denied the means to make an 
effective defense, in violation of U.C.A.§77-32-301. 
ARGUMENT 
L Mr. Reed was denied the effective assistance of counsel. 
Counsel is deemed ineffective by constitutional standards if his 
performance both falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and 
prejudices his client. Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 
Adams v. State. 123 P.3d 400, 406, 2005 UT 62,1f25. Ineffective assistance of 
counsel must be understood under the specific circumstances of this case. The issue is not 
whether Mr. Reed was present, nor whether he was a restricted person, nor even whether 
the unidentified man pulled a gun, buy merely whether Mr. Reed pulled a gun. 
Accordingly, the most dispositive evidence would be that tending to prove or disprove 
that he had a gun. Trial counsel was well apprized that the State would present the 
following evidence: 
1. The eyewitness testimony of Orlando Martinez that Mr. Reed pulled a gun; 
2. The eyewitness testimony of Joseph Houlihan that Mr. Reed pulled a gun; and 
3. Police Chief Rick Harrison's testimony that he found a .45 caliber bullet and a 
gun-cleaning kit in the vehicle Mr. Reed was riding in. 
In opposition to these witnesses, trial counsel potentially had available: 
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1. The eyewitness testimony of Megen Bell, Mr. Reed's girlfriend, that Mr. Reed 
did not have a gun (Addendum); 
2. Mr. Martinez's testimony from the preliminary hearing which contradicted his 
trial testimony in certain details, thus reflecting on his credibility (163, pp. 11, 22; 165, 
pp.131, 147); 
3. The criminal histories of Mr. Martinez and Mr. Houlihan, potentially impugning 
the witnesses' credibility; 
4. Fingerprint evidence refuting any connection between Mr. Reed and the .45 
caliber bullet; 
5. Dispatch tapes refuting Mr. Houlihan's statements to the 911 operator; and 
6. A private investigator to locate potential defense witnesses. 
Notwithstanding the availability of all these resources, as acknowledged by her 
own motions (21-35), trial counsel only availed herself of the criminal histories. As to the 
rest, Mr. Reed was denied the effective assistance of counsel. 
A. Trial counsel failed to request a continuance so as to be able to obtain requested 
materials and witnesses necessary to impeach the State's eyidence. On November 1, 
2007, a trial date was set for December 19, 2007. On December 3, 2007, trial counsel 
filed motions under U.C.A. §77-32-301 requesting the production of a transcript of the 
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preliminary hearing, criminal histories of the prosecution witnesses, fingerprinting of the 
bullet and gun-cleaning kit found in the vehicle, copies of the dispatch tapes, and the 
hiring of a private investigator. Due to the late date, she also requested that these matters 
be expedited. 21-35. So far, so good. 
Unfortunately, except for the criminal histories of the witnesses, which the court 
ordered to be provided (57-58), trial counsel took no further action on the motions. She 
made no request that they be acted on before trial, nor did she request that trial be 
continued in order to obtain them. In effect, she abandoned the motions, apparently for no 
good reason. Trial counsel's own motions acknowledge that the materials were necessary 
to address the critical issue of whether or not Mr. Reed possessed a gun. Requesting the 
materials certainly satisfied an objective standard for effective defense. Abandoning those 
requests defied that standard. Mr. Reed was thus denied the effective assistance of 
counsel in mid-flight. *' 
B. Trial counsel failed to call a critical exculpatory witness. All of the witnesses 
agreed that a young lady was present together with Mr. Reed and the unidentified gun-
man (163, p. 12; 165, pp. 135, 138, 141-142, 146, 148, 155, 160-161, 177, 189, 192,204-
205, 207-210, 212, 215-216), and in contrast to the unidentified gunman, Ms. Bell 
provided her name and a witness statement. Addendum. It is also clear that trial counsel 
8 
knew of her and intended to call her as a witness. 165, p. 11. Defense counsel should have 
made the effort to subpoena this key witness. Instead, counsel apparently relied upon the 
State's list of proposed witnesses (45-46). Ideally, she would have checked with the State 
prior to trial to ensure the witness was subpoenaed. Instead, as is apparent from the 
transcript, she merely remained hopeful that Ms. Bell would show up without having been 
subpoenaed. 165, p. 11. At the very least, when trial counsel learned that the State had not 
subpoenaed Ms. Bell, counsel should have objected and requested a continuance. 
The failure to obtain at least one corroborating eyewitness or any materials to im-
peach the State's witnesses cannot be written off as mere harmless error. Approximately 
two hours into deliberation, the jury queried "Is a hung jury an option?" 165, p. 244. 
Clearly the guilt or innocence of the defendant was still a close question at that point. Ms. 
Bell's testimony to corroborate Mr. Reed's that he had no weapon, or positive evidence 
that Mr. Reed's fingerprints were absent from either the .45 bullet or the gun-cleaning kit, 
or the discrepancies between Mr. Martinez's statements at the preliminary hearing versus 
at trial, or discrepancies between Mr. Houlihan's statements to the 911 operator as 
compared to his trial testimony, could each have pushed the potentially hung jury in the 
opposite direction from which it went. Collectively, there is little doubt they would have 
led to a different outcome. 
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II. The trial court effectively denied Mr. Reed the materials necessary to impeach 
the State's evidence. 
U.C.A. §77-32-301 
Each county, city, and town shall provide for the defense of an 
indigent in criminal cases in the courts and various administrative bodies of 
the state in accordance with the following minimum standards: 
(3) provide the investigatory materials necessary for a 
complete defense 
To the extent trial counsel filed the correct motions, the trial court abused its 
discretion in failing to act upon those motions. Granting or denying a motion may fall 
within the broad discretion of the trial court, but failing to act does not. This is especially 
so, where, as here, belated though they may have been, counsel went so far as to file 
Requests to Submit for Decision. 102-109. 
Rule 12(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states: "A motion made before 
trial shall be determined before trial unless the court for good cause orders that the ruling 
be deferred for later determination." (Emphasis added). The trial court did not have 
discretion not to rule on the defense's motions. Taken together with the extent to which 
Mr. Reed was handicapped in his defense by not having the requested materials, the trial 
court's failure to rule on Mr. Reed's motions constitutes an abuse of discretion warranting 
a new trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
You don't bring a knife to a gun fight, and there's little point in having a gun if 
you're going to run at the sight of a knife. Under most circumstances, Mr. Martinez 
would have been charged with assault. Instead, Mr. Reed was charged with possession of 
a weapon he maintains he did not possess. The only reason Mr. Reed was not able to ef-
fectively lay that issue before the jury was that he was denied the witnesses and materials 
necessary to do so. Regardless of whether that denial was due to the ineffectiveness of 
counsel or abuse of discretion by the trial court, Mr. Reed's conviction should be vacated 
and he should be granted a new trial. 
DATED this 7th day of August, 2009. 
Michael L. Humiston 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that two copies of the foregoing Appellant's Opening Brief were mailed to 
the following this 7th day of August, 2009. 
Kris C. Leonard 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Appellate Division 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Michael L. Humiston 
ADDENDUM 
Roosevelt City Police Department 
Statement of Witness 
Date? 
I am givin^this statement to , who has identified llimself as a cut U 
Police Officer. I understand that statements I make to the officer or put in this voluntary ° ' ' 
statement may be presented to a magistrate or a judge in lieu of my swom testimony at a 
preliminary examination. Any false statement I make and that I do not believe to be true may 
subject me to criminal punishment as a class A misdemeanor. 
P h o n e : ^ 5 5 ~ A T D D . Q . B : ~ 2 - | S ^ S S # : ^ £ 2 S n ^ S z 3 Q 3 
Statement: 
x^ TvoT c\ ^ cvs VYV\ ^ M I K \di §ffi fXCYX ^ 
f£d 
>n N^^^er^^^^noXe^cl VCO 
W^N 
y)\)\\firt\,fe 
Cff3 
I have read this statement consisting of _ . page (s), each page of which bears my 
signature, and I do affirm that all facts and statements contained herein are true and correct. 
Witness SignaturaLf persoamaking voluntary  t ry statement 
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